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EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF
COMPUTER PROOF
Drew Van Denover
Abstract Some mathematical theorems can be proven only with
the help of computer programs. Does this reliance on computers
introduce empirics into math, and thereby change the nature of
proof? I argue no. We must distinguish between the warrant the
proof gives for its conclusion, and our knowledge of that warrant.
A proof is a priori if and only if the conclusion follows deductively
from the premises without empirical justification. I start by
defending this definition, and proceed to demonstrate that
computer-generated proofs meet its criterion.
For more than one hundred years, mathematicians tried and
failed to produce a valid mathematical proof of the ―Four Color
Theorem‖, or 4TC. First proposed in 1852, the 4TC conjecture
remained unproven until Kenneth Appel and Wolfgang Haken
published their solution in 1976. Debate immediately erupted
about the legitimacy of their methods. Unlike every previous
proof, Appel and Haken‘s work made ineliminable use of a
computer program. Their knowledge of the 4TC depended on the
operations of a physical machine—apparently introducing
empirical elements into mathematics, the purest a priori science.
Thomas Tymoczko soon emerged as a chief critic of the possibility
of a ―computer-assisted proof.‖ These CAPs, he alleged,
incorporate contingent facts about the world, whereas
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mathematical proofs require a priori certainty. On his account, we
should reject the 4TC as a true ―theorem‖ lest we fundamentally
alter the nature of mathematical truth. He writes:
[The] use of computers, as in the 4CT,
introduces
empirical
experiments
into
mathematics. Whether or not we choose to
regard the 4CT as proved, we must admit that
the current proof is no traditional proof, no a
priori deduction of a statement from premises
…. I will suggest that, if we accept the 4CT as a
theorem, we are committed to changing the
sense of ―theorem‖, or, more to the point, to
changing the sense of the underlying concept of
―proof.‖1
I disagree with Tymoczko; CAPs can be a priori in the requisite
sense. Something is a priori if it has a non-empirical justification—
regardless of whether humans have a priori knowledge of that
justification. We must distinguish between the warrant the proof
gives for its conclusion and our knowledge of that warrant. I
contend CAPs provide excellent, a posteriori reasons for thinking
that Appel‘s proof has an a priori justification.
Most of the debate turns on what we mean by ―a priori
proof.‖ I begin by discussing competing definitions, and then offer
an account of how computer-generated proofs satisfy the best one.
I conclude that we need not choose between CAPs‘ legitimacy and
the aprioricity of mathematics.
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Assumptions
I want to make explicit some of the background
assumptions underlying my thesis. First, I assume that normal
mathematical reasoning, such as we find in ordinary humanproduced proofs, counts as a priori. Following Frege, this is not to
say that we discover arithmetic truths without reference to sense
experience, but rather that their ultimate justification makes no use
of it. Contemporary philosophers of mathematics seem largely to
accept this thesis, and anyone denying it would see no epistemic
difference between computer-derived proofs and the more natural
kind. For the purposes of this paper, we shall therefore bracket
objections to the aprioricity of mathematics in general.
Second, we need to outline our general conception of
―proof.‖ I agree with Rota that a mathematical proof is
fundamentally an argument—a ―sequence of steps which leads to
the desired conclusion.‖2 Like any other argument, proofs proceed
from a set of premises to a conclusion, which we call a
mathematical theorem. I see at least two necessary conditions for
proof-hood (although more may exist). An argument is a
mathematical proof only if (1) the argument is deductively valid
and (2) it is in some sense a priori. These are distinct criteria.
Heuristic arguments are increasingly common in the field, and
indeed they can provide legitimate a priori mathematical
knowledge—however, ―The proposition was true for all of the 106
cases we tested‖ does not amount to a proof of that proposition.
Observe that Goldbach‘s Conjecture, for all its inductive support,
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has yet to achieve the status of ―theorem.‖ Similarly, many
arguments deductively entail their conclusions, but because their
premises are fundamentally empirical claims, they do not enjoy a
priori status. Tymoczko‘s argument denies the second condition
that CAPs are a priori, but we will seek to reaffirm it.
Defining “A Priori Proof”
We must clarify what we mean by ―a priori.‖ In this section
I reject the definition Tymoczko uses, which requires proofs
necessarily to generate a priori knowledge. Instead, I offer my own
definition which does not refer to any particular individual‘s
knowledge at all.
Recall that aprioricity is an epistemological concept. It
primarily concerns knowledge—that is, justified true beliefs.3
Specifically, it concerns the ―justified‖ part of knowledge. A given
belief is a priori when its justification does not depend on sense
experience. I agree with Kripke that, strictly speaking, the
predicate ―… is a priori‖ applies to knowledge and belief
exclusively, for they are the only bearers of justification.4 We know
something a priori when we know it on the basis of strictly nonempirical evidence.
As such, calling a proof ―a priori‖ involves a little sleight of
hand. Proofs are neither beliefs nor knowledge. They are
arguments—abstract mathematical constructions consisting of a set
of premises, a conclusion, and the inferential relations between
them. An argument is a proof whether or not any particular person
3

Where the justification and the belief are related in the right way, of course.
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University Press.), 35
4

186

knows it is a proof, and whether or not anyone believes it is a
proof. We need to stipulate what ―a priori‖ means when applied to
mathematical arguments.
Before presenting my own definition, I want to discuss
what I take to be the received definition of ―a priori proof‖:
(1)

An argument is an ―a priori proof‖ if and only if it is
capable of providing a priori knowledge of its conclusion to
people with sufficient mathematical ability and knowledge
of the involved concepts.

Intuitively, I find this view highly plausible. As mathematical
apriorists by assumption, we think that all mathematical truth can
be known without sense experience. Naturally, proofs should
provide exactly that knowledge. This definition paints the
following picture: When a mathematician reads the proof of a
theorem, he mentally internalizes each proceeding step. He holds
the entire proof in his mind, and can see why it is true. Because he
knows the workings of the proof, he believes the theorem it
underpins. If asked, he can rely on his understanding alone to
justify that belief without recourse to experiential propositions. His
knowledge of the theorem is completely a priori.
On definition (1), CAPs are not a priori because they are
not surveyable. Since no one mathematician can read the proof in
its entirety, no one person can truly know it. Appel presumably
understands the concepts involved in his proof of 4CT, but when
he justifies the results step by step, he must refer to empirical work
done by computers. For this reason, Tymoczko denies that CAPs
are truly ―proofs‖—they cannot actually provide a priori
187

knowledge:
The mathematician surveys the proof in its
entirety, and thereby comes to know the
conclusion …. The proof relates the
mathematical known to the mathematical
knower, and the surveyability of the proof
enables it to be comprehended by the pure
power of the intellect—surveyed by the mind‘s
eye, as it were. Because of surveyability,
mathematical theorems are credited by some
philosophers with a kind of certainty
unobtainable
in
the
other
sciences.
Mathematical theorems are known a priori.5
I agree with Tymoczko that CAPs are not surveyable in the sense
he requires, and if we accept (1), CAPs are not truly proofs.
However, I think we have good reason to reject (1) as the criterion
for a priori proofs: requiring that proofs be capable of generating a
priori knowledge indexes what counts as ―proof‖ to particular,
individual minds. On (1), whether a given argument is a proof
depends on facts about the person attempting to understand it.
Because knowledge is a species of belief, it belongs to
individuals. When Jones and Smith witness the same event, they
form their own separate beliefs about it, which then count as
knowledge if and only if they are true. So ―Jones‘ knowledge‖ and
―Smith‘s knowledge‖ are distinct entities. Further, what is
sufficient to provide Jones with ―knowledge of x‖ may not be
sufficient to provide Smith with ―knowledge of x.‖ What actually
will generate knowledge in a person depends on facts about that
5
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person‘s perception and reasoning processes, and such
contingencies are unacceptable for a good definition of proof.
Imagine an argument that requires hundreds of billions of
pages to write down on paper (for example, suppose we somehow
printed the results from every computation performed during
Appel‘s the proof of the 4CT). That argument would be
unsurveyable in a very real way. The time required to read and
absorb it would exceed the human lifespan several times over. By
(1), the argument is not a proof. But suppose now that modern
technology increases human life expectancy tenfold, and cognitive
enhancements permit us to read quickly enough to digest the
argument and know its contents. The same definition dictates that
now, the argument is a proof. Its proof-status changed because of
strictly empirical facts which had nothing to do with the argument
itself! Suppose further that an environmental disaster destroys the
technology, but leaves record of the argument intact. Has it now
ceased being a proof?
Mathematicians and philosophers often assert that ―false
proof‖ is a contradiction in terms.6 Proofs are certain and timeless.
If Euclid proved a proposition in 300 B.C., that same proof
remains equally valid today. Definition (1) does not capture this
character of mathematical proofs. We do not want our criteria for
proof-hood to depend on any one person‘s a priori knowledge,
because what is a priori knowable in practice will always be
contingent. We need a different concept of ―a priori proof.‖
A better definition of ―a priori proof‖ will determine the
argument‘s epistemic status using only features of the argument
6
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itself—not features of the entities reading it. Remember, to call
something a priori is to say that its ultimate justification does not
depend on empirical propositions; whether any one person‘s
knowledge of that justification is also a priori is irrelevant. Hence,
I offer a counter-definition:
(2) An argument is an ―a priori proof‖ if and only if:
(a) none of its premises depend on empirical evidence for
justification; and
(b) the conclusion follows from the premises using only
rules of inference with non-empirical justification.
Unlike (1), (2) does not depend upon contingent facts unrelated to
the argument itself. The argument will be a priori or not regardless
of whom or what is reading it. Moreover, (2) best captures the
spirit of a priori as a feature of justifications, rather than genesis.
(1) seems dependent on the ―context of discovery‖—it asks, ―How,
in practice, did some mathematician come to know the theorem in
question?‖ (2) cares only about how we might, in principle, justify
that theorem. If we can do so independently of sense experience,
our theorem has achieved a priori status. On (2), ―a priori proofs‖
are arguments guaranteed to generate a priori justifications, which
is precisely what proofs ought to do.
Given our assumption that ―normal‖ mathematical
knowledge is a priori, we can derive the following:

190

(2*) An argument is an ―a priori proof‖ if:
(a) all its premises are mathematical axioms or theorems;
and
(b) the conclusion follows from the premises using only
rules of logic.
Deciding whether computer-assisted proofs are legitimately a
priori requires only determining whether they meet our two
sufficient conditions. Do the computers assisting us employ only
mathematically warranted inferences? We have excellent reason
for believing they do.
Do CAPs Meet Our Definition?
Consider Appel and Haken‘s proof of the 4CT, for example.
Exactly what role did computers play? We should remember that
one hundred percent of the conceptual work for the proof was
developed by humans. Stated roughly,7 Appel and Hanken
developed an algorithm—a mechanical procedure for applying a
finite number of mathematical operations to some input,
terminating in some output. The algorithm—like any valid
algorithm—involves only mathematically warranted steps. The
mathematicians proved, using tried-and-true human-generated
methods, that when the algorithm takes a graph as input, a certain
output results if and only if the graph has the property of being

7
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―reducible‖.8 They further proved that if every one of a particular
set of graphs is reducible, the 4CT must necessarily be correct. No
suspect ―computer-proof‖ has been invoked thus far.
Applying the algorithm by hand, however, is simply
impracticable. The procedure requires ―analysis of about ten
thousand neighborhoods of vertices‖ for each of about fifteen
hundred graphs.9 Given the computational nature of an algorithm,
the only reasonable way forward involves outsourcing these
calculations to a machine. To do so, they wrote a machinelanguage program—another series of mechanical instructions that,
in theory, cause the machine to run through the algorithm precisely
as Appel and Hanken described it, storing its data in bits of RAM.
On the hypothesis that the computer functions properly, it executes
the algorithm using only inferences with a priori justification.
Three things in this process are of note. First, the work
done by computer in CAPs remains purely combinatorial—
different in scope, but not kind, from the role that calculators and
even abaci serve in ―normal‖ mathematics. That role comes
nowhere near the creative artificial intelligence Tymoczko
imagines:
Suppose that advances in computer science lead
to the following circumstances. We can program
a computer to initiate a search through various
proof procedures, with subprograms to modify
8

I will not discuss here what ―reducibility‖ means as a property of graphs. For
details of the proof, see Appel and Hanken, 2002.
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and combine procedures in appropriate
circumstances, until it finds a proof of statement
A. After a long time, the computer reports a
proof of A, although we can‘t reconstruct the
general shape of the proof beyond the bare
minimum…. [T]he question is whether
mathematicians would have sufficient faith in
the reliability of computers to accept this
result.10
The kind of method Tymoczko describes goes far beyond a
computer-assisted proof—it represents a computer-generated
proof. Specifically, Tymoczko hypothesizes a scenario in which a
computer creates a ―proof‖ of Peano arithmetic‘s inconsistency.
Surely, he says, logicians would find this result ―hard to swallow.‖
I agree; we should be very skeptical of such a hypothetical proof—
but that hesitation does not indicate that mathematicians lack
confidence in the basic calculations computers perform. Again,
CAPs require only this latter kind of combinatorial computation.
Second, we see that computers might introduce error into
proof results in two ways: through flaws in their programming (a
software bug), or malfunctions in the physical processes
underlying their data storage systems (a hardware bug). Both are
real possibilities, but neither differs substantially from the errors
commonly found in flawed attempts at proof by humans. We
misuse notation and make similar syntactical mistakes with
regularity, and our calculations are exponentially more error-prone
than those of machines. If I ask a mathematician for even a
(relatively) simple combinatorial result—say, the rational
10
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representation of 
, he will immediately
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7
i1
reach for a calculator or (even more likely thirty years after
Tymoczko published his paper) a computer. Why? Because
 computers are simply more reliable than humans.
empirically,
Appel, in his philosophical defense of his work, observes:
When proofs are long and highly computational,
it may be argued that even when hand checking
is possible, the probability of human error is
considerably higher than that of machine error;
moreover, if the computations are sufficiently
routine, the validity of programs themselves is
easier to verify than the correctness of hand
computations.11
His last comment raises the final, most important point of how
computer-derivations function in practice: they are subject to easy
and repeated verification. Certainly, it is possible for a single
processor or a single program to malfunction in some way and
thereby produce a false result. But CAPs like that of the 4TC have
been reproduced on hundreds of individual computers, and their
results agreed upon by numerous independently-coded programs.
In fact, new implementations for deriving the 4CT proof continue
to appear even in the 21st century. Granted, these results should not
give us complete, absolute confidence in its validity (as
philosophers, we regard very few things as certain beyond a
doubt). But given the rigor and frequency of their verification, we
can be just about as confident that Appel and Haken‘s algorithm
11

Appel, The Four Color Problem, 207.

194

indeed generates the desired output as we can be about any
empirical fact.
I say ―empirical‖ without concern, though Tymoczko and
his sympathizers would balk at such an admission. They grant that
computers are almost always reliable, but argue that when
assessing their capacity to prove theorems, we are exclusively
concerned with a priori evidence. Tymoczko says as much:
[T]here is a great deal of accumulated evidence
for the reliability of computers in [CAP]
operations, and the work of the original
computers
was
checked
by
other
computers....The reliability of the 4CT,
however, is not of the same degree as that
guaranteed by traditional proofs, for this
reliability rests on the assessment of a complex
set of empirical factors.12
In my estimation, this common argument misses the crucial
distinction between the proof‘s a priori justification for its
conclusion, and our knowledge of that justification. As per our
definition, proof-hood requires that arguments begin from a priori
premises, and proceed along a priori methods; our belief that it
does so needn‘t be similarly a priori. We have overwhelming a
posteriori evidence that the computer‘s methodology follows strict
a priori guidelines, and therefore meets our criteria for an ―a priori
proof.‖

12
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Conclusion
Tymoczko and I start from fundamentally different
conceptions of what ―a priori‖ means in the context of
mathematical results. He roots his entire project in the idea that
that ―mathematical theorems are known a priori.‖13 Are they
always? Remember that knowledge is proprietary to individuals.
One person can have a priori knowledge of a fact another person
knows only empirically, and this principle does not change when
applied to mathematical knowledge. Much (dare I say, most)
mathematical knowledge exists on an a posteriori basis. For
example, I have no graduate training in mathematics, but when a
Fields medalist informs me she has proven an extremely high-level
theorem, I believe her. Is my belief justified? I say yes. This
woman is likely the most knowledgeable expert on the planet. She
has nothing to gain from lying, but everything to lose if caught. If I
cannot trust her opinion, I can trust no one‘s. Is my belief true? If
she really has proven the theorem, it must be. In such a case, my
belief constitutes a posteriori knowledge of a mathematical
theorem. I expect that most undergraduates accept their professors‘
word about theorems prima facie, and thereby create knowledge of
a similar kind. Asserting that theorems are necessarily known a
priori seems simply unrealistic.
We better capture the aprioricity of theorems with reference
not to how particular individuals actually know them, but how
those theorems are justified. For this, we must look to the proofs‘
methods. As per (2*), mathematical arguments follow a priori
methods when neither their premises nor inferences depend upon
13
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sense experience for justification. This certainly seems to be the
case for Appel and Haken‘s proof of the 4TC, and for other CAPs
like it.
Tymoczko rightly asserts that mathematicians’ knowledge
of CAPs is necessarily empirical. That fact is difficult to deny.
However, it does not speak to the internal operations of the proof,
which (in my estimation) are the sole determinants of the proof‘s a
priori status. As long the proof offers an a priori justification for its
conclusion, it does not matter whether humans know of that
justification in an a priori way. In essence: we need not know a
priori that the proof’s warrant is a priori. Insofar as we trust our
belief that hundreds of tests run on hundreds of thousands of
combinations of software and hardware platforms cannot all be
completely mistaken, we should trust our belief that CAPs justify
their conclusion without reliance on empirics. Anyone suggesting
that CAPs are not sufficient ―proofs‖ for lack of a priori
justification cannot ignore this result.
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